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1.0 Introduction 
 
Antitrust policy is one branch of public policy that may be used to limit the market 
power of deregulated and privatised public utilities. The experience over the last two 
decades or so of the telecommunications and airlines industries in the United States 
and of many of the deregulated utilities in the United Kingdom is that the opening up 
to competition of monopolies that were previously protected by statute or regulation, 
led initially to entry; but, after a period of a few years, there were strong incentives for 
these new enterprises to merge. This experience suggests that countries contemplating 
privatisation and deregulation of public utilities should consider whether their 
antitrust regimes (and, in particular, their merger policy) are appropriate to the period 
of privatisation and deregulation.  
 
The current provisions of Australia's antitrust merger regime have remained virtually 
unchanged since 1974. Australia's experience with these provisions in the subsequent 
quarter of a century yields some useful lessons for countries that are contemplating 
the introduction, or reform, of their antitrust policies in preparation of greater reliance 
on market constraints on their public utilities. This paper assesses the Australian 
experience and argues that certain features of the Australian regime are useful 
contributions to the international stock of regulatory design, whereas other features of 
the Australian regime are best not replicated. 
 
Any assessment of public policy must ultimately depend on the social welfare 
function that one adopts. This paper will adopt as a definition of value the difference 
between willingness to pay and opportunity cost; and anything that enhances value 
will be regarded as good. Like much economic activity, mergers are undertaken 
because they enhance the value that accrues to the parties to the merger. But value 
may accrue to a person either because more value has been created or because one is 
able to gain a larger share of the value that exists. It is common to label behaviour that 
creates value as efficient, and to label behaviour that merely enhances bargaining 
power as monopolisation or rent seeking.
1 If we adopt the value standard in assessing 
public policy, monopoly is neither uniformly good nor is it uniformly bad. 
Nevertheless, antitrust policy carries a general presumption against monopoly because 
one classic way in which a monopolist increases its bargaining power with respect to 
its customers is by limiting the amount of output it is prepared to supply. That is, the 
monopolist deliberately destroys value in order to increase its bargaining power with 
respect to its customers. This paper accepts this presumption. It accepts that a public 
policy motivated by the maximisation of value will seek to prevent mergers that 
enhance monopoly power because, in general, the enhancement of monopoly power 
will diminish value. 
 
Mergers and takeovers involve the sale of assets. Like other forms of trade, mergers 
occur because the willingness to pay for the assets by the buyer exceeds the 
opportunity cost of the sale to the seller. The gains from trade can derive from three 
                                                             
1 According to Buchanan (1980) economic rent “is that part of the payment to an owner of resources 
over and above that which those resources could command in any alternative use.” (p.3).  As 
monopoly profits are payments above opportunity costs they are economic rents.  They are not the 
only form of economic rents however.  For instance, economic rents can be achieved by those 
favoured by government licences or from favourable government contracts.   2
principal sources: an increase in economic efficiency, an increase in monopoly power 
or an increase in the scope for rent seeking more broadly The increase in economic 
efficiency can take many forms; but these generally can be classified as either 
identifying assets that the market has previously undervalued or taking advantage of 
some type of synergy, that can better be realised within a merged entity than by means 
of trade between the activities of the two enterprises. The increase in monopoly power 
is generally a result of an increase in concentration in a particular market which may 
lead to problems of monopoly either because of increased likelihood of collusion (see 
Stigler 1964;and Green and Porter 1984) or because of independent behaviour 
(Cournot 1838; and Cowling and Waterson 1976).  In addition to seeking monopoly 
rents, mergers and acquisitions can be motivated by other forms of rent seeking.  For 
instance, parties with close alignments with the government may find it profitable to 
acquire a firm whose profits are driven by success in gaining government contracts.   
Antitrust merger policy that aims to maximise value should distinguish between 
mergers with these motivations. Putting the matter crudely, it should allow to proceed 
those mergers that are motivated by economic efficiency and it should disallow those 
mergers that are motivated by an increase in monopoly power or rent seeking. In 
practice, a particular merger can rarely be placed neatly into  these  boxes. For 
instance, real-life mergers have the uncomfortable habit of straddling efficiency and 
monopoly power – with one foot firmly in one box and the other foot more-or-less 
firmly in the other. The task of the regulator or the court is to decide: what is going 
on? If the merger is clearly all about increasing the monopoly power of the parties or 
rent seeking, it should be stopped. If there are clear efficiency advantages or if it is not 
clear which of the considerations predominates, the merger should be allowed to 
proceed on the ground that regulators and courts should place the onus of proof (as a 
lawyer would put it) on the party which is advocating interference in the freedom of 
the market. 
 
This paper will return to the point of onus of proof towards the end. It is clearly 
important in the rules and operation of any antitrust policy. It also biases many 
judgements within transition economies as to whether antitrust policy should be 
adopted. Even if one adopts the standard of value as one’s standard of public policy, 
one may still be opposed to antitrust policy on the ground that the overwhelming 
majority of all mergers are value-enhancing. This presumption would have particular 
appeal in an economy, such as Hong Kong, where international trade and investment 
flows are relatively free. But even in Hong Kong one can readily observe economic 
activities, such as rail links and transport tunnels, where monopoly power might be 
used to destroy value. It is appropriate to ask how antitrust policy might be structured 
so as to enhance the value that is created by industries such as these. That is the 
question that is addressed by this paper: if a nation is contemplating antitrust merger 
policy, does the experience of Australia offer any guidance as to how value might be  
maximised?  In drawing on Australia’s experience we primarily focus on the success 
of Australian policy in distinguishing between mergers that enhance efficiency and 
mergers that enhance monopoly power. Although mergers may be enhanced by rent-
seeking, this is currently not a major driver of mergers or acquisitions in Australia.  
We do however make some comments at the end of the paper on how changes in the 
Australian merger laws could reduce the incentive for rent seeking.  
The distinction between conduct prompted by economic efficiency and conduct 
prompted by monopoly power is fundamental to antitrust policy. But merger policy 
has a very particular set of issues that sets it apart from other elements of antitrust   3
policy: timeliness and secrecy are most often crucial for its successful 
implementation. Timeliness is related to secrecy in some obvious ways: the longer the 
regulator delays dealing with a confidential matter, the greater is the danger that 
information will leak to the market. The leaking of information may raise the price of 
the target and thereby reduce the gains to the bidder (Schwert 1996). If gains to the 
bidder are reduced by the processes of the law, there is a danger that the incentives for 
enterprises to seek out efficiency-enhancing mergers will be reduced. Even in a public 
process, such as a trial, timeliness is related to efficiency, not via secrecy but through 
the spread of information. A long trial may make efficiency-enhancing opportunities 
disappear because the world changes or because a more-attractive bidder may appear 
or because the second most attractive bidder loses interest. To repeat, the danger with 
these happenings is not that they discourage mergers that are motivated by increasing 
monopoly power. The danger is that delays and consequent flows of information may 
discourage enterprises from searching out efficiency-enhancing merger opportunities.  
This is not to imply that process must be kept secret once the merger has been made 
public.  To do so runs the danger of undermining confidence in the decision-making 
process.   
 
These reflections lead us to propose that two criteria are necessary if antitrust merger 
policy is to enhance value. In the first place, the criteria for assessing mergers should 
direct the regulators or the courts to allow those mergers that promote economic 
efficiency and to disallow those mergers that promote monopoly power. Secondly, the 
process of assessment should be able to be conducted in a way that maintains 
confidentiality (until the merger is made public by the firms involved) and is speedy. 
 
This paper explains the formal processes of Australian antitrust merger policy and 
how it performs against these twin sets of criteria. The experience over the last quarter 
of a century is that Australia’s formal, statutory processes have been quite unsuitable 
when assessed against these criteria. The paper explains why the delay and public 
nature of these processes have made them quite unsuitable. These problems with the 
formal, statutory processes have led to the evolution of a process of confidential, 
informal clearance of mergers. This process has no basis in any Australian statute. 
Confidential, informal clearance of mergers has satisfied the criterion of a speedy and 
confidential process; but it has not enabled the proper weighing of efficiency and 
monopoly. The process of informal clearance of mergers has led, in turn, to two other 
problems: a lack of formal guidance by means of precedent; and the assumption by 
the antitrust regulator of an unhealthy degree of power to extract concessions from the 
enterprises which wish to merge. In brief, Australia’s reliance on discretion over rules 
has limited the extent to which its merger policy has been able to enhance the value 
generated by the Australian economy. 
 
This criticism applies to antitrust merger policy in other jurisdictions. Antitrust 
merger policy in both the United States and Europe has become an administrative 
rather than a court-centred process. This has caused lawyers to raise questions about 
appropriate processes and the development of the law.  As noted by Sims and Herman 
(1997):  
 
B]ecause ... most merger objections are resolved by consent decree; merger 
litigation (at least outside the hospital industry) has become a rare beast.  
Given that consent decree negotiations are private, and confidentiality rules   4
(and sometimes agency prudence) limit what can be disclosed about why the 
agency did what it did, it is increasingly difficult for those who are not 
interacting regularly with the agency and other merger lawyers to be fully 
informed about how the agencies (and, to an even greater degree, particularly 
staffers) are approaching specific types of problems.
2  
 
2.0 The Proscribed Behaviour 
2.1 The Wording of the Section 
 
The principal proscription of mergers in Australia’s antitrust law is to be found in s50 
of the Trade Practices Act (the Act). Its present wording is (in part): 
s .50  Prohibition of acquisitions that would result in a substantial lessening of competition 
  (1)  A corporation must not directly or indirectly: 
  (a)  acquire shares in the capital of a body corporate; or 
  (b)  acquire any assets of a person; 
if the acquisition would have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition in a market. 
  (2)  A person must not directly or indirectly: 
  (a)  acquire shares in the capital of a corporation; or 
  (b)  acquire any assets of a corporation; 
if the acquisition would have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition in a market. 
  (3)  Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account for the purposes of 
subsections (1) and (2) in determining whether the acquisition would have the 
effect, or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in a 
market, the following matters must be taken into account: 
  (a)  the actual and potential level of import competition in the market; 
  (b)  the height of barriers to entry to the market; 
  (c)  the level of concentration in the market; 
  (d)  the degree of countervailing power in the market; 
  (e)  the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the acquirer being able to 
significantly and sustainably increase prices or profit margins; 
  (f)  the extent to which substitutes are available in the market or are likely to be 
available in the market; 
  (g)  the dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth, innovation 
and product differentiation; 
  (h)  the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the removal from the 
market of a vigorous and effective competitor; 
  (i)  the nature and extent of vertical integration in the market. 
  
                                                             
2  
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The principal mergers that have been dealt with under this section are summarised in 
the Appendix to this paper. The cases are summarised in diagrams that have been 
constructed similar to the trees used in the extended form of game theory for games 
that take place over time. The decisions closer to the top of the page occurred prior to 
the decisions lower on the page. At any moment, the player who has to make the 
decision is confronted with the options that are outlined. The option that was, in fact, 
selected is that which is indicated by an arrow.  
Some of the cases summarised in the Appendix were dealt with under a version of s50 
whose criterion differed from that which is quoted above. The original proscription 
was similar to the present. The first merger that came before the courts was the 
attempted acquisition of Avis Rent-a-Car by Ansett Transport Industries (Ansett Avis).  
This was tried following the amendments to the Act in 1977 in which the test of 
substantial lessening of competition was amended to that of an acquisition by a 
corporation that would be, or be likely to be, in a position to control or dominate a 
market. The trial judge in Ansett Avis considered the phrase ‘control or dominate’. He 
found …’that the word “dominate” is to be construed as something less that 
“control”
i… and, because of this, the word “control” was redundant. It was removed.  
The only other three mergers to be tried under the section - Australian Meat Holdings’ 
attempt to acquire Thomas Borthwick & Sons (AMH), the attempt by Arnotts to 
acquire the biscuit business of Nabisco Australia (Arnotts), and the attempt by Davids 
holdings to take over QIW Retailers (QIW v Davids) -  were assessed according to the 
criterion of dominance of a market.  
The present section came into effect on 21 January 1993. Although proceedings have 
been issued under the current section, no cases have resulted in judgment. The reasons 
for the lack of litigation under the section will be explored in section 2.2 of this paper. 
The current (and original) test of substantial lessening of competition uses words that 
appear elsewhere in the antitrust provisions of the Act. This means that we are able to 
speak confidently of the meaning of the test without the aid of a decision in a trial 
under the section. The seminal authority for the phrase is to be found in a case under 
s47 involving exclusive dealing: the decision of the Full Federal Court in Outboard 
Marine Australia Pty Ltd v Hecar Investments (No 6) Pty Ltd (1982) ATPR 40-327. 
In that decision, the Full Federal Court held that the state of competition depended on 
the structure of the market, so a substantial lessening of competition involved a 
change in the structure of the market. To prove a substantial lessening of competition, 
one had to prove that the structure of the market with the conduct in question would 
be less conducive to competitive behaviour than would be the structure of the market 
without the conduct in question. The Full Court put it in these words: 
More assistance [in defining competition] can be gleaned from the decision of 
the Trade Practices Tribunal with Woodward J. presiding, in Re Queensland 
Co-Operative Milling Association Limited; Re Defiance Holdings Limited 
(1976) ATPR 40-012; (1976) 8 A.L.R. 481. There an economic concept of 
competition was adopted. Five elements of market structure were noted by the 
Tribunal as being relevant to the determination of the state of competition in a 
market. Of those, the most important factor was said to be the height of barriers 
to entry, that is, the ease with which new firms might enter and secure a viable 
market. …   6
It would seem that ‘competition’ for the purposes of sec. 47(10) must be read as 
referring to a process or state of affairs in the market. In considering the state of 
competition a detailed evaluation of the market structure seems to be required. 
In the Dandy case Smithers J. regarded as necessary an assessment of the nature 
and extent of competition which would exist therein but for the conduct in 
question, the operation of the market and the extent of the contemplated 
lessening. 
Two other decisions of the Trade Practices Tribunal are relevant here – Ford 
Motor Co. of Australia Limited v. Ford Sales Co. of Australia Limited (1977) 
ATPR 40-043; and Southern Cross Beverages Pty. Limited (1981) ATPR 40-
200. In both cases, the Tribunal undertook a detailed analysis of the market, the 
state of competition therein and the likely effect of the conduct upon 
competition in the market. In our opinion, the same type of approach should 
have been adopted in the present case.
ii 
A further gloss on the notion of substantial lessening of competition has been the 
gradual emergence of the future-with-and-without test. The test makes it clear that the 
substantial lessening does not involve a comparison of the future with the past. Rather 
it is a forward-looking test. In particular, it involves a comparison of the future state 
of competition in the market if the merger were to occur with the future state of 
competition in the market if the merger were not to occur.  
The future-with-and-without test is at least implicit in the Tribunal’s decision of Re 
QCMA and Defiance Holdings which has as one of its sub-headings ‘The Future of 
Barnes without merger’. The test has been quite explicitly adopted by the Full Court 
of the Federal Court in Stirling Harbour Services Pty Limited v Bunbury Port 
Authority
iii 
There was no dispute but that in determining whether the proposed conduct has 
the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition in the relevant market, the Court has to: 
-  consider the likely state of future competition in the market ‘with and 
without’ the impugned conduct; and  
-  on the basis of such consideration, conclude whether the conduct has the 
proscribed purpose or effect  
Dandy Power Equipment Pty Limited v Mercury Marine Pty Limited (1982) 
ATPR 40-315 at 43,887; (1982) 64 FLR 238 at 259; Outboard marine Australia 
Pty Limited v Hecar Investments No 6 Pty Limited (1982)  ATPR 40-327 at 
43,982; (182) 44 ALR 667 at 669-670. The test is not a ‘before and after’ test, 
although, as a matter of fact, the existing state of competition in the market may 
throw some light on the likely future state of competition in the market absent 
the impugned conduct. 
The reference by the Tribunal in QCMA and by the Full Federal Court in Outboard 
Marine v Hecar to the primacy of the condition entry in considering the extent to 
which a market is competitive gives a clear hint as to the time horizon over which 
competition is to be assessed. If one gives primacy to the condition of entry, there is a 
clear indication that one is assessing competitive forces over a long time horizon. The 
point is made in Brunt (1990) as follows:
iv   7
Competition is a process rather than a situation. Dynamic processes of 
substitution are at work. Technological change in products and processes, 
whether small or large, is ongoing and there are changing tastes and shifting 
demographic and locational factors to which business firms respond. Profits and 
losses move the system: it is the hope of supernormal profits and some respite 
from the ‘perennial gale’ that motivates firms’ endeavours to discover and 
supply the kinds of goods and services their customers want and to strive for 
cost-efficiency. Such a vision tells us that effective competition is fully 
compatible with the existence of strictly ‘limited monopolies’ resting upon 
some short run advantage or upon distinctive characteristics of product 
(including location). Where there is effective competition, it is the on-going 
substitution process that ensures that any achievement of market power will be 
transitory.  
The paucity of litigation under s50 has meant that there are many questions over 
which the courts have given companies and their legal advisers little guidance – 
simply because the issues have not arisen during the course of litigation. One such 
area of uncertainty is the relevance of arguments to do with efficiency under s50. In 
section 1.0 above, we argued that mergers could be motivated either by prospective 
enhancements in economic efficiency or by prospective increases in monopoly power. 
The words of the test as set out in s50 make no explicit reference to economic 
efficiency. So the extent to which argument over economic efficiency would be 
relevant to a case tried under s50 has not been decided.  
The issue did arise in the Arnotts litigation. Both the judgment at the trial and the Full 
Court on appeal make the point that there are substantial economies of scale in the 
production and distribution of biscuits. The Courts found the point to go to market 
power; but it could have been interpreted as an efficiency explanation of the merger. 
The appeal judgment was in no doubt as to the importance of economies of scale for 
Arnotts:
v 
Arnotts’ economies of scale flow, of course, from its market share. Once again, 
more detail would have been helpful. But it is clear that Arnotts does enjoy 
substantial economies of scale. Its volume provides flexibility in the use of 
factory ovens and warehouses and unit economies in advertising, with emphasis 
upon the name and tradition of Arnotts. Its great product range minimises 
seasonal sales fluctuations, with resulting benefits to cash flow, the efficient use 
of manufacturing and distribution resources and retention of supermarket shelf 
space allocations. 
Similarly, there are economies of scale in distribution costs. A company which 
accounts for 65% of all biscuit sales must have a marked advantage, in terms of 
unit distribution costs, over companies which have only 13% or 8% of the 
market. All three companies distribute directly to the retail stores but the 
Arnotts’ truck must be off-loading many more biscuits at each stop. Again, 
there must be an advantage to Arnotts in spreading the cost of a sales 
representative’s visit to a store amongst 65 units, as against Weston’s 13 units 
or Nabisco’s 8. 
If a merger enhances economic efficiency, that may be relevant to argument under s50 
because the enhancements may enhance the ability of the merged entity to survive in 
a competitive market. Alternatively, arguments and evidence concerning economic   8
efficiency could be introduced under the rubric of substantiality. For example, a 
merger may lessen competition; but may enhance efficiency. The efficiency 
considerations may be relevant to a court’s consideration as to whether the lessening 
of competition is substantial.  
To repeat, these arguments have not been considered by a judge in proceedings under 
s50. Until the courts consider more cases, many questions of this kind will remain 
unresolved. Certainly, it is not clear whether and in what way efficiency arguments 
can be considered by the courts under s50. To the extent that there is uncertainty, the 
principal issues that, as a matter of economic policy, should be considered in the 
antitrust treatment of mergers may not be able to be considered by the Australian 
courts. The principal issues should be whether the merger is primarily motivated by 
increases in economic efficiency or by increases in monopoly power. To the extent 
that s50 makes it likely that these issues cannot be considered, the Australian model 
provides a lesson as to what other jurisdictions should avoid. 
 
The courts in New Zealand have had more opportunities to consider the relevance of 
efficiency to the ways in which mergers might result in the lessening of competition. 
In an unreported case involving a strike-out application
vi, the High Court (per Gallen 
J. and Dr M. Brunt) had this to say: 
 
In applying s. 27, counsel for Clear invites us to disregard any positive 
contribution that efficiencies may make to the competitive process. He says the 
existence of authorisation in the New Zealand Act makes efficiencies relevant 
only in so far as they give rise to heightened barriers to entry and hence an 
enhancement of market power. We cannot accept this contention. It is contrary 
to a well-established line of authority in New Zealand law that receives its latest 
statement in Port Nelson Limited v Commerce Commission (1996) 7 TCLR 217 
in relation to s.27 (at p.228):- 
 
“The relevant inquiry is as to substantially lessening competition. That is 
not the same as substantially lessening the effectiveness of a particular 
competitor. Competition in a market is a much broader concept. It is 
defined in s 3(1) as meaning ‘workable and effective competition’. That 
encompasses a market framework which participants may enter and in 
which they may engage in rivalrous behaviour with the expectation of 
deriving advantage from greater efficiency. There appears to have been 
consistent acceptance of the elements of competition in Re Queensland 
Co-operative Milling Association Limited; Re Defiance Holdings Limited 
[(1976) 25 FLR 169; 8 ALR 481, 517; 1 ATPR 40-012, 17,247]at p188; p 
515; p 17,246, and further quotation is unnecessary.” 
 
2.2 Reasons for Lack of Litigation 
As was noted in the preceding section of this paper, in the first quarter of a century of 
the Act, only four mergers have been litigated to judgment. Although private parties   9
have the right to issue proceedings for breach of s50, private parties cannot apply for 
an injunction to prevent a merger from occurring. However, a company that is faced 
with an unwanted offer of takeover can apply for a declaration that the takeover 
would infringe s50. BHP made an application of this type when faced with the 
unwanted attentions of Robert Holmes a Court’s Bell Resources Group. Similarly, 
QIW made an application for a declaration of breach of s50 when it was faced with 
the unwanted attention of Davids Holdings and the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (the Commission)
vii was reluctant to apply for an injunction. 
However, even in this situation, QIW managed to persuade the Commonwealth 
Attorney-General to apply for an injunction to prevent the merger. 
Apart from the possibility of an application for a declaration, the only action a private 
party can take to obtain an injunction to prevent a merger is to lobby the Commission 
or the Attorney-General to apply for an injunction. All four mergers that have been 
litigated to a decision under s50 have involved applications by the Commission or (in 
the case of QIW v Davids) by the Attorney-General for injunctions or orders to divest. 
In the cases of AMH and Arnotts the application had to be for divestiture because the 
acquisition had been already been undertaken. 
Unlike some other jurisdictions, Australia does not compel parties to a merger to 
notify the regulator of their intentions. In its first three years, the Act provided for the 
clearance of mergers. This was abolished from 1 July 1977. Since then, the Act has 
provided for two ways in which parties contemplating a merger may deal with the 
Commission: they may apply for authorisation (see section 3 below) or they may 
consummate the merger and dare the Commission to litigate. Between 1 July 1977 
and the development of the present system of informal clearances, parties had little 
incentive to notify the Commission of their intentions, so there was much discussion 
of a system of compulsory notification. Indeed, New Zealand (which incorporated 
Australia’s antitrust provisions into its Commerce Act pursuant to the Australia-New 
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement of 1983) added a compulsion to 
notify. 
In recent times, there has been little or no discussion in Australia of compulsory 
notification. It appears that the Commission gets to hear of all significant mergers 
prior to their consummation.  
  
From Figure 1, it is clear that, although the vast majority of matters are referred to the 
Commission by the parties, there is a range of other avenues, including other 
regulators (such as the Federal Investment Review Board (FIRB)), the selling of 
public assets (such as electricity generators), media reports and complaints by affected 
parties.  In a number of cases, matters are referred to the Commission by more than 
one source.     10
 
Figure 1: Merger and acquisition matters referred to the Commission  
 
 
Source: ACCC Journal, Issue 25, February 2000, p73. 
 
From the preceding discussion, it should be clear that the Australian experience yields 
few lessons as to the need for a system of compulsory notification. Under the present 
Australian system, there is no need for compulsory notification: the regulator gains 
the information that it needs to enable it to perform its task: the parties are prepared to 
approach the Commission because of the development of the non-statutory process of 
informal clearances. 
It is hardly surprising that litigation as a means of implementing antitrust merger 
policy is unpopular with the regulator and with the parties. It is time-consuming and it 
involves considerable uncertainty. The processes of litigation may discourage and 
ultimately prevent anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions; but they may also delay 
or discourage efficiency-enhancing mergers and acquisitions.  This is particularly the 
case for mergers and acquisitions for which the window of opportunity is small or the 
major efficiency benefits are immediate. Litigation may deter efficiency-enhancing 
mergers and result in economic loss in a number of different ways. 
Delay probably constitutes the most significant potential for economic loss.  In some 
mergers and acquisitions the economic synergies are of most value in the current 
market environment.  Delay, by reducing these efficiencies, may destroy the 
economic gains from the acquisition.  The window of opportunity may pass during the 
process. 
 
Even if the acquisition ultimately does proceed, the economic benefits of the 
acquisition may not accrue to the offeror. For example, it is commonly said that many 
mergers between banks are motivated by a more-efficient bank being able to use its 
systems to identify under-performing assets in other banks. If a lengthy court process 
occurs prior to the consummation of the merger, the problem of the under-performing 











assets may have been addressed so that the bank that identified the problem is unable 
to gain a return for its efforts. 
 
The cost of delaying a merger or acquisition has been recognised by the courts. This 
was the subject of comment by Wilcox J in his decision in AMH
viii: 
 
It is for me a matter of concern that the crucial determination of the limits of a 
market – about which question I assume commercial people frequently make 
almost intuitive judgements – should be seen as requiring the time, effort and 
expense involved in this case. My concern is intensified by the circumstances 
that, almost by definition, proceedings to prevent a breach of sec. 50, or to 
reverse the effects of an antecedent breach, will always involve a measure of 
urgency. 
 
The courts have made similar remarks when assessing the balance of convenience 
relevant to applications for interlocutory injunctions in merger cases. In Trade 
Practices Commission v Santos LTD (1992) ATPR 41-195, Hill J said (at 40,637) that 
a Court must: 
weigh up the real consequences to each party, taking in mind not only the 
public interest but also the private interests involved.  There is, in my view, no 
presumption that an interim injunction should be granted.   
Similarly, in Trade Practices Commission v Rank Commercial LTD (1994), Davies J 
observed:
ix 
A court cannot hold the underlying commercial situation in a state of status 
quo during the lengthy period in which preparation for a trial might ordinarily 
be expected to take.  In this period the facts, including share values, will 
change.   
 
Furthermore, delay combined with the publication of the proposed acquisition may 
allow a competing bidder to acquire the target firm. The recent proposed mergers 
between Taubmans and Wattyl on the one hand and Santos/Sagasco on the other, 
show that the delay caused by the processes of litigation may enable a rival suitor to 
appear and so the proposed acquirer may withdraw their offer and sell their shares to 
the new suitor.  
 
It may be argued that the delay did no harm: that the delay enabled the appearance of 
a new suitor that enabled the generation of more efficiencies or less monopoly power 
than would have been generated by the original proposal of marriage. It may be 
thought that this is the explanation as to why these mergers were not consummated. 
However, this characterisation may be a distortion. Litigation is expensive and the 
prospects of victory in complex commercial litigation are always uncertain. An 
alternative characterisation would be that an offeror enmeshed in complex litigation 
might prefer to accept the certain money offered by the new suitor to the prospect of 
pursuing the uncertain prize of consummation of its original desires. 
   12
 
3.0 Authorisation 
3.1 The System 
 
Authorisation is a process by which the parties to a merger or acquisition may be 
granted immunity for breaching s50 or s50A of the Act.  This immunity is given if the 
Commission
x forms the view that the merger or acquisition will be of net benefit to 
the public – s90. In considering net benefits, the Commission can consider 
efficiencies. So, in contrast to the process of a trial under s50, the process of 
authorisation explicitly allows for the consideration of efficiencies. Authorisation is 
initiated by one of the parties to the merger. It is not initiated by the Commission.   
  
An authorisation decision by the Commission can be appealed to the Tribunal.
xi  A 
review by the Tribunal is a re-hearing of the matter. Whereas the Commission is an 
administrative body, the Tribunal is a quasi-judicial body. It is chaired by a judge of 
the Federal Court, who sits with two other members, one of whom is usually an 
economist and the other is a person with business experience. 
 
Once a merger or acquisition has been authorised (by either the Commission or, on 
appeal, by the Tribunal), parties to the merger or acquisition are granted immunity 
from breaching s50 so long as the conditions pertaining to the authorisation are not 
breached.   
 
Section 90 purports to limit the time that the Commission has to determine 
applications for authorisation. Section 90 (11) states that, if the Commission does not 
determine an application for authorisation within 30 days from its receipt, the 
Commission shall be deemed to have granted the application. However, s90 (11A) 
provides that this period may be extended to 45 days if the Commission notifies the 
applicant that it considers the matter to be complex. Furthermore, the period can be 
extended if the Commission requires extra information, if a person (such as an 
objector) wishes the Commission to hold a conference or if the applicant agrees to a 
request by the Commission to an extension of time. (It may be supposed that an 
applicant who wishes their application to succeed is unlikely to refuse such a request.) 
 
Section 102 imposes a 60-day limit on the Tribunal in its review of determinations by 
the Commission. But this period can be extended at the discretion of the Tribunal if 
the Tribunal considers that, for reasons such as the complexity of the matter, the 
matter cannot be dealt with properly within the period of 60 days. 
 
Applications for authorisation are not only time-consuming, they are also public. In 
processing applications, the Commission feels the need to undertake research, and the 
Commission’s research generally involves asking competitors, suppliers and 
purchasers what they think of the proposed merger. Furthermore, those who have 
been notified of the merger by the Commission may request a conference which 
provides extra publicity.  
 
As was noted in section 2.1 above, the ‘future with and without’ test was first 
articulated by the Tribunal. This implies that it was first articulated in the context of 
an appeal from an authorisation decision of the Commission. So in weighing the   13
benefit to the public against the detriment caused by the lessening of competition, the 
Tribunal (and the Commission) compare the future with and without the merger. 
 
Like the process of litigation, the process of authorisation is public and, although 
there are time limits as explained above, both processes are relatively time-
consuming. A key difference between the two processes is that the process of 
authorisation explicitly allows for the weighing of detriment caused by any lessening 
of competition against any offsetting benefit to the public.  
 
The explicit consideration of benefits to the public under the process of authorisation 
includes, of course, the consideration of economic efficiency. Although the 
Commission has, on occasions demanded that benefits be ‘passed on’ to final 
consumers if they are to be considered (see Officer and Williams 1995) this is not 
because of the wording of the statute. 
 
Indeed in the seminal decision by the Tribunal, in the merger case of QCMA, the 
Tribunal went out of its way to state that all benefits, no matter whom they accrue to, 




One question that arises is whether by the public is meant the consuming public. 
One submission to us was that, in the context of the objectives of the Act, we 
should direct our attention to that part of the public concerned with the use or 
consumption of flour in the Queensland market. This would be to interpret the 
phrase as pointing to much the same considerations as those raised by sec. 
21(1)(b) of the British Restrictive Practices Act 1956, which asks whether 
withholding approval would ‘deny to the public as purchasers, consumers or 
users … specific and substantial benefits or advantages …’. However this is not 
what the Australian Act says; and we cannot but think that the choice of a wider 
expression was deliberate, as pointing to some wider conception of the public 
interest, though no doubt the interests of the public as purchasers, consumers or 
users must fall within it and bulk large. 
 
Another question raised is whether public benefit must be contrasted with 
private benefit. Can a benefit to some of the private parties to the merger – for 
example the shareholders of Barnes – be claimed as a public benefit? … we 
would not wish to rule out of consideration any argument coming within the 
widest possible conception of public benefit. This we see as anything of value to 
the community generally, any contribution to the aims pursued by the society 
including as one of its principal elements (in the context of trade practices 
legislation) the achievement of the economic goals of efficiency and progress. 
 
3.2 Applications for Authorisation of Mergers 
 
Given the clear mandate of the Commission to consider the key issues of both the 
increase in monopoly power and the effects of the merger on efficiency following an 
application for authorisation, one might predict that parties would far prefer to apply 
for authorisation than to risk litigation in the courts. However, their revealed 
preferences are that they avoid applications for authorisation as much as they avoid 
the courts. Table 1 shows the number of applications lodged during the last six years   14
for authorisation of mergers and acquisitions recorded in the public register of the 
Commission. 
 
Table 1: Applications for authorisations of acquisitions registered with the 
Commission 
 







2001 (to date)  0 
Source: Public Register of Applications for Authorisation, Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission website (www.accc.gov.au). 
 
Table 1 suggests that very few parties apply for authorisation of mergers. Given the 
open process and its time-consuming nature perhaps the real puzzle is why there are 
any applications at all. The explanation lies in the features of any particular merger 
that distinguish it from the vast majority of mergers for which applications are not 
made. An example may be found in Re QIW. As was noted in section 2 above, 
immediately prior to this application for authorisation QIW was a party to s50 
litigation, when it successfully used the courts to thwart the unwanted advances of 
Davids Holdings (QIW v Davids).  In that litigation, the courts found in favour of 
QIW that the product dimension of the relevant market was confined to the 
wholesaling of groceries to independent retailers – that is, that the integrated grocery 
chains were not participants in the relevant market. That finding, if it were transported 
to other factual situations, would effectively have precluded further mergers among 
specialist grocery wholesalers. The authorisation was an attempt by Davids to clear 
the way for its acquisition of Composite Buyers Limited. Davids clearly reasoned 
that, unless the acquisition was authorised, it would run the risk of a private 
application for divestiture for breach of s50 immediately the acquisition had been 
consummated. The Commission granted the authorisation; and this decision was 
upheld (in its principal elements) on appeal by the Tribunal. 
 
An interesting feature of the merger was that Davids did not proceed to acquire CBL. 
QIW was also interested in acquiring CBL. Immediately prior to the decision of the 
Commission, QIW increased its offer for CBL and succeeded in acquiring a 
controlling interest in CBL.  
 
The delay, and the subsequent possibility of a counter-offer are two respects in which 
the process of authorisation is similar to that of litigation under s50. The public nature 
of the process is another. The delay and lack of secrecy of these two statutory 
processes explain their lack of appeal to merging parties and, one may guess, to the 
Commission. The result has been the development in Australia of a quick and secret 
process which has no foundation in the antitrust statute. This process is generally 
known as the process of informal clearance.   15
 
4.0 Informal Clearances 
4.1 The Process 
 
The costs and risks associated with the statutory processes combined with the powers 
of the Commission to seek an injunction to prevent a merger or acquisition have seen 
an informal notification and clearance process develop in Australia. The informal 
notification and clearance process is not based in the statute.  Although the 
Commission has published Merger Guidelines which inform parties of the informal 
process, the guidelines have no statutory basis.  As a result, the Commission has 
significant discretion in how it goes about assessing proposed mergers and 
acquisitions and the conditions it endeavours to impose on the acquirer.      
The informal clearance process consist of three major parts: 
 
   notification; 
   assessment; and  
   outcome. 
 
As was noted in section 2.1 above, parties to a proposed merger or acquisition are not 
obligated under the Act to notify the Commission of their proposal.  However, many 
do.   As shown in Figure 1 above, well in excess of half of the mergers and 
acquisitions notified to the Commission over the last two years have been notified by 
the parties.  This is done either on a public or on a confidential basis.  
 
The reason parties notify the Commission is to gain some comfort as to whether the 
Commission will seek an injunction if they proceed with the acquisition.  If the 
Commission indicates it will seek an injunction if the acquisition proceeds, the 
notification process allows the party(s) to explore with the Commission options for 
changing the proposed acquisition to address the competition concerns.  This process 
enables the Commission to make the party(s) aware of its view of an acquisition and 
merger before the matter reaches the court.            
 
The informal processes by which the Commission assesses merger and acquisitions is 
described in its Merger Guidelines.  The process aims to consider the matters a court 
would consider under s50.  
  
A major issue affecting the process and how the Commission conducts its 
investigation is whether the merger or acquisition is notified to the Commission on a 
confidential basis.  Maintaining confidentiality restricts the Commission’s ability to 
seek the views of, and to acquire information from, other parties such as competitor 
suppliers and  buyers.  That is the confidentiality limits the Commission’s opportunity 
to conduct market inquiries.  
 
In some cases this may not matter.  For example the Commission has indicated that it 
will not oppose mergers and acquisitions that fall below a certain concentration 
threshold.  As noted by the Commission in its Merger Guidelines: 
 
The Commission has adopted concentration thresholds below which it is 
unlikely to intervene in a proposed merger.  The thresholds have been   16
established on the basis of the Commission’s historical experience of mergers 
and knowledge of current market structures. 
If the merger will result in a post-merger combined market share of the four 
(or fewer) largest firms (CR4) of 75 per cent or more and the merged firm will 
supply at least 15 per cent of the relevant market, the Commission will want to 
give further consideration to a merger proposal before being satisfied that it 
will not result in a substantial lessening of competition.  In any event, if the 
merged firm will supply 40 per cent or more of the market, the Commission 
will want to give the merger further consideration.  The two thresholds reflect 
concerns with the potential exercise of both coordinated market power and 
unilateral market power. 
Below these thresholds, the Commission is unlikely to take any further 
  interest in a merger.  
 
 
In other cases, especially where the likely effects of a merger or acquisition are 
complex, the Commission’s market inquiries may be extremely important.  As a 
result, the Commission may not be able to form a final view on the matter until the 
proposal has been made public.  
 
In the case of the merger proposed between Santos and Sagasco, the Commission 
granted an informal clearance and then changed its mind. The behaviour of the 
Commission is readily explained: if, for reasons of secrecy, they are unable to make 
any enquiries other than of the parties, the information they may be relying on may be 
biased, partial or even misleading. In such circumstances, it is clear that the 
Commission must be able to change its mind when it is able to make open enquiries. 
 
The criteria employed in the process of informal clearance, while set out in detail in 
the Merger Guidelines, are based on the Commission’s own interpretation of s50. The 
process of informal clearance refers to s50 in that, if the applicant is given an informal 
clearance, it is given an assurance that, on the basis of the information available to it, 
the Commission will not issue proceedings for breach of s50 should the proposed 
merger proceed. Accordingly, the Commission must satisfy itself that the merger will 
not breach s50. 
 
One important feature of the Commission’s interpretation of s50 in its processing of 
informal clearances is the very limited role it allows for consideration of economic 
efficiency. As was noted in section 2.1 above, the place of efficiency arguments under 
s50 has never been explicitly considered by the courts – because it has not arisen in 
any of the four cases that have run to judgment.  
 
The extent to which the Commission is prepared to consider economic efficiency 
within the context of an informal application for clearance is set out in paragraphs 
5.159 and following of the Commission’s Merger Guidelines. There is a marked 
similarity between these provisions and those of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The 
ACCC Guidelines read in part: 
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5.159 As discussed in paragraphs 5.19-5.20, although s. 50 is concerned with 
the level of competition in markets and not the competitiveness of individual 
firms, and while efficiencies are more generally relevant in the context of 
authorisation, the extent to which any efficiency enhancing aspects of a merger 
may impact on the competitiveness of markets is relevant in the context of s. 50. 
 
5.160 Where a merger enhances the efficiency of the merged firm, for example 
by achieving economies of scale or effectively combining research and 
development facilities, it may have the effect of creating a new or enhanced 
competitive constraint on the unilateral conduct of other firms in the market or it 
may undermine the conditions for coordinated conduct. Pecuniary benefits, such 
as lower input prices due to enhanced bargaining power, may also be relevant in 
a s. 50 context. 
 
5.161 If efficiencies are likely to result in lower (or not significantly higher) 
prices, increased output and/or higher quality goods or services, the merger may 
not substantially lessen competition. 
 
5.162 While recognising that precise quantification of such efficiencies is not 
generally possible, the Commission will require strong and credible evidence 
that such efficiencies are likely to accrue and that the claimed benefits for 
competition are likely to follow. 
 
Paragraph 5.160 indicates that the role of any consideration of economic efficiency 
within the context of an application for an informal clearance is highly circumscribed. 
In particular, if a firm with a large market share believes that it can gain access to 
efficiencies through merger, that consideration will be ruled by the Commission to be 
irrelevant to an application for informal clearance  Indeed, the Commission may well 
follow the lead of the Full Federal Court in Arnotts, as quoted above, and say that to 
the extent that a merger enhances the efficiency of a firm with a large market share, it 
is likely to lessen competition.  
 
This interpretation by the Commission means that the Commission elects to rule as 
irrelevant many arguments of economic efficiency in the context of applications for 
informal clearance. The Commission will normally respond to such arguments by 
informing the parties that, if they wish to put such arguments, they must submit an 
application for authorisation – with its attendant delays and publicity. This response is 
usually sufficient to persuade the parties to drop the submissions.  
 
It is clearly unsatisfactory that issues of economic efficiency cannot be fully 
considered under the procedure by which the mergers are dealt with by the Australian 
antitrust authority. This problem could be remedied if s 50 were to be amended to 
invite the courts and, therefore, the Commission in its processing of applications for 
clearance to consider the trade-offs between considerations of competition and 
efficiency. Such a change would enable the efficiency implications of a merger to be 
considered. Under the present Australian arrangements they are only considered very 
rarely because the statutory option of an application for authorisation is no real option 
for the great bulk of mergers.  
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One model as to how the Australian statute could be changed is provided by Canada’s 
Competition Act (1985). The principal merger provision is found in s 92(1)  which 
proscribes mergers that prevent or lessen competition substantially. This is qualified 
by s 96(1) which provides an efficiency defence. It is worth quoting in full (in its 
English version): 
 
The Tribunal shall not make an order under section 92 if it finds that the merger 
or proposed merger in respect of which the application is made has brought 
about or is likely to bring about gains in efficiency that will be greater than, and 
will offset, the effects of any prevention or lessening of competition that will 
result or is likely to result from the merger or proposed merger and that the 
gains in efficiency would not be likely be attained if the order were made. 
 
From 1991 until very recently, the Merger Enforcement Guidelines (MEG) of the 
Commissioner had indicated that the effects of an anti-competitive merger were to be 
assessed by estimating the aggregate effect of the merger on social surplus. A recent 
decision on appeal from a decision of the Tribunal (The Commissioner of Competition 
v Superior Propane Inc. and ICG Propane Inc 2001 FCA 104) makes it clear that this 
approach was an incorrect interpretation of the law. Under the previous approach of 
the Commission it had focussed solely on aggregate surplus and had ignored other 
factors, such as the distribution of the surplus. The Court found that the correct 
approach is not to disregard any of the effects of the lessening of competition that 
would be likely to result from a merger. 
 
Although some may consider this judgment a setback for the cause of economic 
efficiency, the decision in Superior Propane merely brings the Canadian standard into 
line with the standard applied by the Australian Tribunal in merger cases. As the 
Tribunal has said since the earliest of cases, the public interest is sufficiently broad to 
enable all considerations to be argued before the Tribunal. In effect, the decision in 
Superior Propane establishes that Canada has a statutory standard that is very similar 
to that which would be applied by the Tribunal in its consideration of the 
authorisation of a merger – if such a case were to come to it for consideration. If the 
statute is to reflect a proper weighing of competition and efficiency considerations, 
the same standard should be incorporated in s 50. 
4.2 Outcomes of an Informal Clearance 
The Commission has a number of options after it has assessed a proposed merger.  It 
can: 
   indicate that it will not oppose the merger or acquisition; 
   indicate that it will oppose the merger or acquisition unless the party(s) 
agree to certain conditions or to act in a certain manner; 
   indicate it will oppose the merger or acquisition under any conditions.   
 
As shown in Table 2, the majority of matters that reach a final decision by the 
Commission are not opposed.  A range of other proposal are withdrawn before the 
Commission reached its final view.     
 
Table 2:  Outcomes of mergers before the Commission   19
  Matters decided   Matters not opposed 
Matters resolved 
with conditions  Matters opposed 
1993-94  77 71    1 5 
1994-95  113 101 5  7 
1995-96  117 105 3  9 
1996-97  147 140 2  5 
1997-98  176 165 6  5 
1998-99  185 168 10 7 
1999-00  208 199 5  4 
 
Sources: ACCC Journal, Issue 25, February 2000 and Section 50 Maergers and 
Acquisitions Register, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission website  
(www.accc.gov.auhttp://accc.gov.au) 
 
The table suggests that the Commission imposes, or attempts to impose conditions on 
a number of mergers. These are the circumstances in which efficiency-enhancing 
acquisitions are most likely to be inhibited. The Commission has significant 
bargaining power to ‘encourage’ the party(s) to significantly alter the form of the 
proposal or to impose conditions on the party(s) if the proposal proceeds.   
 
If the Commission indicates that it is likely to seek an injunction from the courts if the 
proposal proceeded in its submitted form, the party(s) have a number of options: 
 
1.  proceed with the proposal and most likely contest the matter or an injunction 
before the Court; 
2.  seek authorisation of the proposed merger or acquisition from the Commission, 
and if rejected appeal to the Tribunal;  
3.  alter the proposal in a manner to address the concerns of the Commission; 
4.  address any anti-competitive consequences of the merger or acquisition by making 
undertakings under s87B of the Act; or, finally 
5.  decide not to proceed with the proposal. 
 
The first and second options follow the statutory processes described in the previous 
sections.  The third and fourth options are informal processes that give the 
Commission significant discretion.  The major difference between these options is 
whether or not the altered proposal is subject to legally enforceable undertakings.   
     
 
4.3 s87B Undertakings   
 
Under s87B of the Act the Commission, subject to the approval of the courts, is 
allowed to accept written undertakings in connection with its power and functions 
under the Act.  Undertakings are legally enforceable guarantees that the party(s) will 
or will not undertake certain actions following the merger or acquisition. 
 
For instance, say the Commission is concerned that a merger will substantially lessen 
competition in some geographic markets, but not others, the Commission may accept 
undertakings by the merged entity to divest itself (post merger) of certain assets in 
those markets.   
   20
Undertakings also provide the parties with some flexibility where the timeliness of the 
merger or acquisitions is paramount.  Undertakings have been used by parties to 
guarantee divestiture if the Commission forms the view that the merger or 
acquisitions would substantially lessen competition.  In this case undertakings have 
allowed the transaction to proceed while giving the Commission time to assess the 
transaction. 
     
Probably the most detailed undertakings to be given by parties during a merger 
application to the Commission were those given to the Commission by Pioneer 
International Limited, Caltex Australia Limited and Ampol Limited on 28 March 
1995. On 3 November 1994 the parties informed the Commission that they were 
considering a merger. This was announced to the public on 14 December 1994. The 
Commission quickly formed the view that the merger was likely to infringe s50. The 
parties disagreed. Nevertheless they gave numerous undertakings to address the 
concerns raised by the Commission. These undertakings were clearly directed to 
ensure that independent oil companies prospered. The merged entity undertook: 
•  to sell particular terminals to independents by particular dates; 
•  to facilitate access by independents to the terminals that were retained;  
•  during the first 6 years, to offer at least 1,000 megalitres of petrol to independents 
each year on reasonable terms;  
•  during the first 2 years, to use its best endeavours to sell on reasonable terms 35 
retail sites in metropolitan areas with an aggregate volume of 50 megalitres…and 
so on.  
 
In short, Caltex and Ampol felt that they could only prevent the Commission from 
initiating proceedings under s50 by offering to sell quite substantial assets by which 
the Commission could pursue a re-structuring of Australia’s wholesaling and retailing 
of petrol. The Commission has substantial power in its granting of informal 
clearances. 
4.4  Shortcomings of the informal process  
Although this informal process has the scope to reduce some of the delay and 
publicity associated with a proposed merger, it has three major problems.   
 
First, the informal processes are not based in the statute.  Although the Commission’s  
Merger Guidelines inform parties of the informal process, the guidelines have no 
statutory basis.  This creates uncertainty: there are no rules governing the processes 
that the Commission can use following an application for an informal clearance.  
 
Second, the process lacks formal guidance by means of precedent.  As the 
Commission does not publish the reasons for its decision, there are no formal 
precedents to guide future decisions and to subject the decisions to peer review. This 
lack of precedent is another factor that increases the discretion that is exercised by the 
Commission in any particular case. The corollary is that the uncertainty confronting 
the parties to a merger is increased. 
 
Finally, it provides the Commission with significant bargaining power to extract 
concession from the parties. These problems create a risk that efficiency-enhancing   21
mergers will be unnecessarily altered or deterred. Noah (1997) characterises this 
behaviour as ‘administrative arm-twisting’.
3 
 
It might be thought that the need for confidentiality and for speed mean that the 
process cannot be combined with review processes. This is not the case – providing 
the Commission provides reasons for its decisions and any reviews occur after the 
merger has been announced. This could be provided for in legislation. Any review on 
the merits would clearly be problematic if the Commission has been unable to gather 
information. However, if the process were governed by statute, parties would be able 
to appeal if the Commission violated the requirements of the statute. 
 
The number of matters dealt with in Table 3 points to the popularity of the process of 
informal clearance compared with authorisation or litigation. It also points to the 
speed of the process compared with the processes set out in the statute. 
 
 
Table 3:  Duration of matters informally assessed by the Commission  
  1997-98 1998-99 
Less than 2 weeks  36  48 
2-3 weeks  57  56 
4-6 weeks  22  41 
7-9 weeks  3  11 
More than 9 weeks  18  22 
Source: ACCC Journal, Issue 25, February 2000, p 70. 
 
5.0 Lessons from the Australian Experience 
 
Lessons can be drawn from the Australian experience both for how Australia should 
reform its own statute and procedures – and for other jurisdictions that may be 
reconsidering their own commitment to antitrust merger policy if those countries 
wished to maximise value.  
 
The key lessons from the Australian experience that might be drawn for other 
jurisdictions that wished to maximise value are: 
 
1.  The criteria for assessing mergers must explicitly provide for an assessment as to 
whether the merger is primarily motivated by an increase in monopoly power or 
an increase in economic efficiency. 
2.  The process must be quick and must allow for secrecy (up the point that the 
merger is made public by one of the parties). 
 
 
If the Australian legislature wished to maximise value it should: 
                                                             
3 Noah (1997) defines administrative arm-twisting as: ‘a threat by an agency to impose a sanction or 
withhold a benefit in hopes of encouraging ‘voluntary’ compliance with a request that the agency 
could not impose directly on a regulated entity’ We are indebted to Robertson (2001) for this 
reference.   22
 
1.  Give the present clearance process a statutory basis, so that parties can go to the 
Commission with the knowledge that there are some constraints on what it may 
do; 
2.  Legislate by amending to provide that the Commission weighs up monopoly and 
efficiency considerations in considering whether it should grant a clearance; 
3.  Require the Commission to publish its reasons as soon as the merger is public. 
 
 
If applied in other less developed countries, these principles will increase the prospect 
that the regulator will allow value-enhancing mergers.  Furthermore, by increasing the 
transparency of the decisions of the regulator, they will minimise the scope for 
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